North-African migration systems: evolution, transformations and development linkages

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INTRODUCTION

The significant political, social and economic transformations that North Africa\(^1\) has witnessed over the past decades would be impossible to understand without considering the role of the significant migration movements within, towards and particularly from this region. Bordering the wealthy countries of the European Union (EU) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), North Africa has evolved into one of the world’s leading ‘labour frontiers’ (cf. Skeldon 1997). Large-scale migration was not only a response to a demand for labour in EU and the GCC countries, but it has also fundamentally affected social and economic development in migrant sending regions.

Over 8 million migrants originating from North-African countries are currently believed to live abroad, among which 4.7 million in Europe and 2.4 million in Arab oil countries. At the same time, North Africa witnessed significant intra-regional labour migration, in particular to oil-producing Libya. In particular over the last decade, the North African migration system seems to have entered into a migration transition. The most salient features of this have been, besides sustained out-migration, increasing immigration from sub-Saharan countries as well as the new role of North Africa as a transit zone for sub-Saharan and even Asian migrants who want to migrate to Europe.

Persistent and increasing migration from and through North Africa has put relations with European countries under considerable stress. In particular the EU has attempted to ‘externalise’ its restrictive immigration policies through putting North African states under pressure to adopt restrictive immigration laws and regulations and to intensify (joint) border controls (Boubakri 2004; Lutterbeck 2006; Schuster 2005). The creation of such a buffer zone is part of the association agreements the EU has signed with all north African states except Libya aiming at creating a free trade zone, which is believed to promote migration-reducing development in North-African and other Mediterranean sending countries.

Faced with the failure to meet their stated objectives of curbing immigration, there has also been a resurgence in the interest among European states in the potentially positive effects of migration and remittances on social and economic development in migrant sending societies. Among the often conflicting interests of sending and receiving states, the issue of ‘migration and development’ represents an apparent area of common interest, mainly because receiving countries perceive migration-propelled development as a way to alleviate unwanted migration pressures. Particular hope is put on temporary migration which is propagated as a kind of a ‘win-win-win’ strategy to reconcile the interests of the migrants, sending and receiving countries (Castles 2006; de Haas 2006). The European Commission (CEC 2005) the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM, 2005), and the World Bank (2006) have recently suggested boosting temporary migration, in particular of the low skilled. Temporary migration programmes (TMPs) are believed to help host countries to manage the demand for migrant labour; help migrants to gain better legal access to the labour markets of high-income countries; and help sending countries in their efforts to maximize the developmental benefits from emigration (Ruhs 2005:20).

At this point, we can probably learn from the North African experience. Firstly, for North African sending states ‘migration and development’ is not a new issue. On the contrary, migration has been an integral part of their national development strategies since decades. It therefore seems to be useful to learn from prior research on migration and development linkages in North-Africa and to analyse the various policies that the North Af-

\(^1\) We will mainly limit our analysis to the north-African countries bordering the Mediterranean: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Nevertheless, it should be noted the sharp distinction commonly made between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa is not only historically incorrect by neglecting the fact that the Sahara itself is a huge transition zone between these two sub-continental constructs, but, as this paper will show, is also contested by significant and increasing trans-Saharan migration.
rican sending countries have implemented to prevent the ‘brain drain’, encourage return migration, stimulate remittances, ‘channel’ investments by migrants into ‘productive’ enterprises, and, most recently, to involve diaspora populations into national development strategies. Secondly, past policies which European and the GCC countries have pursued in order to stimulate temporary migration to enforce return migration are often ignored but potentially instructive cases to evaluate new proposals to boost temporary migration from the region.

However, understanding the developmental consequences of migration is impossible without understanding the structural forces that cause migration (Taylor 1999). Therefore, the first aim of this paper is to understand the evolution and transformation of the North African migration system between 1945 and 2005, and how this process is reciprocally linked with broader processes of social, political and economic change.

The second aim of this paper is to understand how this migration has affected social and economic development in places, regions and countries of origin and the extent to which governments have been able to influence and enhance this development impact. In order to provide a more detailed picture, this second part of the analysis will focus on the specific case of Morocco, the region’s most prominent emigration country.

MIGRATION SYSTEMS AND MIGRATION TRANSITIONS

However, first of all it seems to be useful to relate the general North African migration experience to two central concepts, namely migration systems and migration transitions. Mabogunje (1970), the founder of migration systems theory, defined a migration system as a set of places linked by flows and counter flows of people, goods, services, and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places. While Mabogunje focused on rural-urban migration within the African continent, Portes and Böröcz (1987) and Kritz et al. (1992) extended this to international migration. International migration systems consist of countries—or rather places within different countries—that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, and are also characterized by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries, areas, and even cities to the concomitant flows of goods, capital (remittances), ideas, ideals, representations and information (Fawcett 1989; Gurak and Caces 1992; Levitt 1998). The fundamental assumption of migration systems theory is that migration alters the social, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving ends—that is, the entire developmental space within which migration processes operate.

The migration transition is the notion that societies and countries in parallel with economic restructuring and concomitant social change and demographic transitions tend to go through a sequence of initially increasing emigration, the coexistence of significant but diminishing emigration and increasing immigration to eventually become net immigration countries (Zelinksy 1971; Skeldon 1997). This is linked to the notion of the ‘migration hump’ developed by Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996), who argued that a temporary increase in migration – a migration hump – has been a usual part of the process of economic development since a certain threshold of wealth is necessary to enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating.

Increasing incomes, the development of transport and communication infrastructure and education tend to give people the capabilities and aspirations to migrate: initially predominantly internally, in later stages increasingly internationally (de Haas 2005a). Only in the longer term, after sustained growth and decreasing opportunity gaps with destination countries, emigration tends to decrease and countries tend to transform from net emigration into net immigration countries. In the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, most western European countries went through such a migration transition (Massey, 1991; Hatton and Williamson 1998). In recent decades, countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Ireland in Europe and Malaysia, Taiwan and South Korea in Asia completed their migration transition. On the basis of the persistent expansion of the greater European migration system, the challenging question is whether North-African will also go through similar migration transitions in the near future.
Colonial and post-colonial migration

The pre-colonial population history of north Africa has been characterised by continually shifting patterns of human settlement. Nomadic or semi-nomadic (transhumance) groups travelled large distances with their herds between summer and winter pastures. Frequent conflicts between tribal groups over natural resources and the control over trade routes were associated with the regular uprooting, movement and resettlement of people. While some nomadic groups settled down and became peasants, other sedentary groups became nomadic or settled down elsewhere. Moreover, all North African countries except Morocco remained at least nominally part of the Ottoman Empire until colonisation, which facilitated significant mobility.

In all north-African countries, modernisation and colonial intrusion occurring as of the mid 19th century has triggered processes of urbanisation and substantial rural-to-urban migration. However, only in the ‘French’ Maghreb colonialism was associated to substantial international movement, in contrast to Libya and Egypt. The French imprint was particularly heavy in Algeria, which was colonised back in 1830 and became an integral part of France. The French protectorates over Tunisia and Morocco were formally established in 1881 and 1912, respectively. Labour recruitment in the Maghreb started during the First World War, when an urgent lack of manpower in France led to the active recruitment of tens of thousands of men for the army, industry and mines (Muus 1995:198). In the Second World War, labour shortages again led to the recruitment of Maghrebi workers and soldiers (Bidwell 1973).

In Egypt, which came under full British control in 1882, modernisation policies pursued as of the second half of the 19th century, and symbolised by the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, intensified traditional patterns of internal migration towards Cairo and, to a lesser extent, Alexandria and the Suez canal zone. Until the 1950s, few Egyptians except for students migrated abroad, and, in fact, more foreigners from Arab and other countries migrated to Egypt (Sell 1988; Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003).

Between the 1950s and 1973, and depending on their political position, attempts by north-African states to either impede or to steer emigration have influenced migration patterns. In a striking reversal of the current situation, this was a time in which sending states imposed more restrictions on migration than receiving states. Through selective passport issuance policies or exit visa requirements, several North African governments have attempted to control migration movements out of their territory.

Egypt regained full independence from the UK in 1953, and after the 1956 Suez Crisis president Nasser came out of the war as an Arab hero, which reinforced Egypt position as leader of the Arab world. Except for the policies to promote the education of Egyptian students abroad in the 1960s, the Egyptian stated actively discouraged labour emigration, mainly through ‘exit visa’ requirements (Choucri 1977; Sell 1988). Within Nasserist socialism, migration was seen as endangering national development through the ‘brain drain’.

Meanwhile, migration from the Maghreb to France had continued since the end of the Second World War. Between 1946 and 1968, six years after Algerian independence, Algerians were allowed to circulate freely between Algeria and France (Collyer 2003). After Morocco and Tunisia became independent from France in 1956 ‘colonial’ migration patterns largely persisted. Because France stopped recruiting Algerian

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2 Although also Mauritania and Libya are part of the Iihad al Maghreb al ‘Arabi, or the Arab Maghreb Union created in 1989, we will use the more conventional delimitation to its three core states.
workers during the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962), migration of factory and mine workers from Morocco was boosted (de Haas 2005b). Nevertheless, Algerian migration continued as a result of the upheaval caused by the 1954-62 war but also by the demand for workers in the rapidly expanding French economy (Collyer 2003). In 1962, over one million colons and harkis (Algerians who served with the French army in the war of independence) left Algeria after the National Liberation Front (FLN) succeeded in pushing France out.

_The guest-worker boom (1963-1972)_

Post-colonial migration was only modest compared with the decade following 1962, in which the Maghreb countries were firmly integrated in the Euro-Mediterranean migration system. In this period Maghreb countries experienced their great labour migration boom towards Europe. For Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia went along with a diversification of migration destinations beyond France. Rapid post-war economic growth in northwest Europe created increasing unskilled labour shortages in sectors such as industry, mining, housing construction and agriculture from the 1950s. This triggered an increasing emigration of “guest workers” from poorer countries around the Mediterranean. Until the early 1960s, most were recruited in south European countries. When this migration stagnated, attention shifted towards south Mediterranean countries. Morocco and Tunisia signed formal agreements on the recruitment of “guest workers” with France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (see table 1). Migration boomed particularly from 1967, to peak in 1972 (de Haas 2005b)

**Table 1**

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<th>Years of signature of labour recruitment agreement with Morocco and Tunisia</th>
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Sources: Baduel 1980; de Haas 2005b.

The influence of formal recruitment by specialized agencies was only important in the initial years of labour migration and in ‘setting the stage’ of subsequent chain migration. Already in the 1960s, spontaneous settlement and informal recruitment through migrant networks by companies has been far more important numerically. Administrative obstacles, long waiting lists and the accompanying bribery incited people to circumvent and to migrate as “tourists” and subsequently “overstaying” (Reniers 1999:683). Most migrants succeeded in obtaining permanent residence papers through a series of legalization campaigns in the Netherlands (1975), Belgium (1975) and in France (1981-1982) (Muus 1995:199). Algerian migration remained overwhelmingly oriented on France. While Germany became the second most important destination for Tunisians, Moroccan migration beyond France concentrated on Belgium and the Netherlands. Tunisia and in particular Morocco pursued strongly pro-emigration policies, in the expectation that their countries would greatly benefit from the experience, training and financial resources of migrants, which were expected to return.

_The 1973 Oil Crisis turning point_

The shock of the 1973 Six-Day war, the Oil Crisis and the ensuing economic recession in Western Europe
would dramatically reshape and expand the North African migration landscape. For Maghrebi-European migration, it meant the end of the recruitment phase and the onset of increasingly restrictive immigration policies pursued by European states, a trend that would persist until the present day. Quite on the contrary, for the Arab oil countries the events of 1973 marked the beginning of massive labour recruitment.

Political change in Egypt and unprecedented economic growth in the oil producing Gulf countries and Libya coincided to cause unprecedented migration from Egypt and, to a much lesser extent, the Maghreb countries to the booming Arab oil countries. The 1973 Arab oil embargo against the US and a number of its Western allies (the ‘Oil Crisis’) led to a quadrupling in oil prices and revenues. This was followed by ambitious development programmes in the Arab oil-producing countries, leading to a huge increase in the demand for labourers. This particularly affected Egypt, where the number of registered emigrants increased from 70,000 in 1970 to a reported 1.4 million in 1976 and to 2.3 million in 1986 (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:27,31).

This coincided with a turnaround in Egyptian migration policies since Sadat came to power in 1970. Sadat’s infitah or open door policies meant a reorientation from the Soviet Union towards the United States, and a move from a centralised plan economy towards liberalisation and increasing opening of the Egyptian economy to foreign investment. Temporary migration became to be seen a means to alleviate demographic pressures and stimulate economic growth. In 1971 all legal barriers to migration were lifted while government workers were allowed to emigrate while maintain the right to return to their jobs (IOM 2005). While removing state constraints and encouraging individualism and consumer desires, the open door policy and liberalisation has been widely seen as increasing inequality in Egyptian society. On top of this was piled the “the remarkable reversal of relative economic conditions” (Sell 1988:93) between Egypt and its eastern and western Arab neighbours.

The majority of migrants went to Saudi Arabia, although all other Arab oil countries received their share of Egyptian migrants. Both skilled and unskilled workers migrated to the Arab oil countries, although most skilled migrants preferred the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) countries. As a key provider of specific skills (such as nursing and teaching) to these labour markets, some scholars have considered Egypt’s specific education policies as an integral part of its broader emigration policies (Fargues 2004:1360). In particular Iraq became a popular destination for unskilled migrants, because of its liberal immigration policies towards fellow Arabs, and its need for foreign labour as a result of the 1980-1988 war with Iran.

The foreign demand for Egyptian labour peaked in 1983, when 3.3 million Egyptian were estimated to work abroad (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:27-31). After 1983, the Iran-Iraq war, falling oil prices, declining demand for construction workers, the inflow of cheaper Asian and South-Asian labour and the policy to replace foreign labour with nationals would cause a gradual decline in the demand for Egyptian and other Arab workers in the GCC countries. This coincided with substantial return migration. (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:27-28).

The oil crisis also created the condition for the emergence of a new migration pole within North Africa. When Libya gained independence from Italy in 1951, the country possessed a small and impoverished population. The discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959 would radically change this situation. From the early 1960s, the petroleum industry came to dominate the economy, and rapidly increasing oil revenues after 1973 allowed the new Nasserist leader Qadhafi to launch ambitious social and economic development schemes. As

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3 Restrictions on labour migration were already relatively eased after the 1967 Six-Day War and the subsequent economic downturn, which heralded the start of more long-term emigration, while students abroad tended to stay abroad after obtaining their degrees (cf. Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003; Nassar 2005).
in the Gulf states, the concomitant labour demand could not be fulfilled locally, and this triggered substantial migration of mostly temporary migrants, predominantly from Egypt. Egyptians have been the largest nationality present in Libya, and worked predominantly in agriculture and education (Hamood 2006:17).

The economic boom in the Arab oil countries also generated significant migration of workers from Tunisia and Morocco. For geographical and political reasons this migration was predominantly oriented on Libya, and mostly consisted of lowly or unskilled migrants who stay for relatively short periods. More long-term migration of skilled workers to the Gulf countries, such as occurred from Egypt, remained relatively modest.

As a more modest but significant oil producer, socialist Algeria benefited from the 1973 surge in oil prices and experienced an economic boom (Collyer 2003). Already in 1945, the number of Algerian workers and their families in France numbered about 350,000.4 In 1968 the Algerian and French governments agreed on a quota of 35,000 migrants per year, which was reduced to 25,000 in 1971. At the same time as Egypt abandoned its restrictionist policies, Algeria, which denounced emigration as a form of post-colonial dependence (Fargues 2004: 1360) formally suspended all migration to France in 1973. This was based on the assumption that booming oil revenues would allow Algeria to employ its own people.

European economic downturn provided the mirror image of the boom of the Arab oil economies. In Europe, the 1973 Oil Crisis heralded a period of economic stagnation and restructuring, resulting in rising structural unemployment and a lower demand for unskilled labourers. This hit the guest-workers disproportionately and led to their mass unemployment. Not only most host societies expected that this migration would be temporary, also most migrants themselves, standing in an ancient tradition of circular migration (de Haas 2003), intended to return after a certain amount of money had been saved to buy some land, construct a house, or start their own enterprise. However, contrary to expectations, large number of Maghrebi migrants ended up staying permanently.

Not only European states but also Algeria and Tunisia (Fargues 2004: 1359-1360) tried to incite migrants to return. Yet these return policies typically failed. First, this was related to the lack of opportunities for economic reintegration in most countries of origin. Morocco and Tunisia suffered much more than the European countries from the structurally higher oil prices and the global economic downturn, and started to experience increasing unemployment while Morocco also entered into a period of political instability and repression following two failed coups d’état against King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972.

Second, the increasingly restrictive immigration policies and in particular the introduction of visa restrictions had the paradoxical effect of pushing migrants into permanent settlement rather than the reverse (Fargues 2004; Obdeijn 1993). Many Maghrebi migrants decided to settle not so much despite but because of the increasingly restrictive immigration policies. Return migrants feared that they would not be allowed to go back to the receiving countries if they failed to re-adapt. Combined with general uncertainty about development in the Maghreb, this made migrants decide to “to be on the safe side” and not to risk their residence abroad (Entzinger 1985:263-275).

Subsequent massive large-scale family reunification heralded the shift from circular to more permanent migration, and besides natural increase and illegal migration this phenomenon mainly explains why northwest European populations of Maghrebi origin kept on increasing at relatively stable rates throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite the formal ban on recruitment. The registered population of Moroccans in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany increased from 400,000 in 1975 to almost one million in 1992 (de Haas 2005b). The registered Tunisian population living in France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland doubled between 1977 and 1992 from 225,000 to 444,000 (calculations based on Gammoudi 2006). Despite the formal ban, migration to Algeria to France was continued also mainly through processes of family

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The number of Algerian descendants (excluding colons and harkis) in France increased from an estimated 500,000 in 1964 to 800,000 in the early 1980s.\(^5\)

**The 1991 Gulf War turning point**

After a period dominated by relatively persistent labour migration from Egypt to the Gulf countries and Libya and family migration from the Maghreb, the North-African migration landscape witnessed fundamental transformations since the late 1980s. Again, a number of political upheavals (Gulf War, outbreak of Algerian civil war, UN embargo on Libya) occurring in 1991-2 played a major role in setting new migration trends and creating increasing interlinkages between north- and sub-African migration systems while solidifying north-Africa’s position in the Euro-Mediterranean migration systems as both origin and transit zone.

The 1991 Gulf War led to massive forced repatriation of migrants from the GCC countries including 700,000 Egyptians from Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait (Baldwin-Edwards 2005:28). These events reinforced the already existent tendency in Gulf countries to increasingly rely on Asian immigrants. This went along with efforts to ‘indigenise’ the labour force of the Gulf countries to decrease dependency on migrants and relieve increasing unemployment among native populations (IOM 2005:54,59). Such reforms were triggered by persistently low oil prices over much of the 1980s and 1990s.

Despite the apparently decreasing potential for migration, Egyptian migration to the Gulf has been more persistent and permanent than the policies intended. Although both Egypt and GCC countries stubbornly classify this migration as temporary, Sell (1988) already observed that many Egyptian migrants stay on for longer periods and that substantial family reunification has occurred. Although they are expected to return, thousands leave Egypt each year with the intention of permanently settling abroad (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:31). It has been proven notoriously difficult to implement the indigenisation policy while semi-legal migrants continue to enter through intricate systems of visa-trading (IOM 2004:60), whereas undocumented labour migrants can also enter the country through making the hadj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, after the Gulf war migration rates quickly resumed to pre-War levels and the number of labour contracts boomed between 1992 and 1995 (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:30,35).

A qualitative change did occur however in the strongly segmented GCC labour markets, native workers mainly take over the high-level position in the labour market, but shun lower-level jobs in the relatively poorly paid private sector (Baldwin-Edwards 2005:27). While Asian immigrants increasingly fill manual jobs in the unskilled segments of the labour market (IOM 2005:62), Egyptian and other Arab migrants to the Gulf increasingly occupy the middle segments of the GCC labour markets (cf. Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:35). Unskilled Egyptian migrants such as construction workers have increasingly migrated to Jordan (IOM 2005:62) and Lebanon, which have also increasingly replaced Iraq as a destination of such workers. The declining potential of migration for unskilled workers to Arab countries has probably stimulated increasing Egyptian migration to Italy and Greece (cf. Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2005:7)

Another major turning point in North African migrations was the impact of the air and arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council between 1992 and 2000. Disappointed by the perceived lack of support from fellow Arab countries, Colonel al-Qadhafi embarked upon a radical reorientation of Libyan foreign policy towards sub-Saharan African countries (Hamood 2006: 17). To counteract the effects of the air embargo and the subsequent international isolation, Libya facilitated entry by land (Hamood 2006: 17-18). Qadhafi positioned himself as an African leader by developing a policy of creating alliances and substantial

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development aid for the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, Libya started to encourage sub-Saharan Africans to work in Libya, even by placing advertisements in daily African newspapers (Hamood 2006; Pliez 2002).

Neither willing nor able to police its vast land borders, Libya became a major destination and transit zone for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Boubakri 2004). Initially, most went to southern border areas and towns such as Kufra and Sebha to work in agricultural projects in the desert, such as the multi-billion-dollar Great Man-Made River project (Hamood 2006:17). In the early 1990s, most migrants came Libya’s neighbours Sudan, Chad and Niger (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005:6), which subsequently developed into transit countries for migrants from a much wider array of Sub-Saharan countries (cf. Pliez, 2004).

However, increasing sub-Saharan immigration can not uniquely be attributed to Libya’s new pan-African politics, but also seems to be part of a more general trend of restructuration and segmentation of Libyan and north-African labour markets. Similar to the Gulf States, an economic downturn through low oil prices and the sanctions led to calls to indigenise the Libyan workforce as of the early 1980s. However, Libyans were not willing to take up the manual and unskilled jobs, which have been increasingly been taken up by sub-Saharan African migrants (Hamood 2006:18), possibly because of a decreased willingness among North African migrants to work in Libya. Libya has increasingly relied on sub-Saharan migrants for heavy work in sectors such as construction and agriculture, whereas Egyptian and Maghrebi workers appear to be more concentrated in slightly more high status service sector jobs.

New migrations to southern Europe

Since 1990, EU states have further strengthened external border controls and tightened up their visa policies (Fargues 2004:1364). However, north African migration to Europe showed a remarkable persistence and even acceleration and also diversification in terms of destination countries. Migration to the established destination countries France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany was primarily continued through the process of family formation. This was partly the consequence of the strikingly high tendency among Maghrebi descendants to marry partners living in their parents’ regions of origin (cf. de Haas 2005b; Lievens 1999).

In particular after 1995, an unexpected resumption of labour migration occurred from the Maghreb but also Egypt to southern Europe (Fargues 2004: 1367). In Mediterranean Europe, the remarkable growth in export-oriented agriculture, construction and tourism has generated increasing demand for seasonal, flexible and low-skill labour (Fargues 2004: 1357). There is a high demand for unskilled migrant labour, especially in the relatively large informal sectors of these countries, Italy in particular (cf. Schneider and Enste, 2002). This makes it relatively easy to find work given local demand for low-skilled, low-paid workers. Themselves former labour exporters, Spain, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Greece have emerged as new major destination countries for Moroccan (to Spain and Italy), Tunisian (mainly to Italy), Algerian (mainly to Spain) and Egyptian (mainly to Italy but also to Greece) migrants since the mid 1980s. Also Portugal hosts increasing populations of often undocumented migrant workers (Peixoto 2002).

Until Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in 1990 and 1991, respectively, migrants were able to enter as tourists. However, the introduction of visas and increasing border controls led to the increasing undocumented and long-term character of this migration rather than a decline. This persistence of migration is largely explained by the high demand for such workers in agricultural, construction and the relatively

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7 Compared to the opportunities in Europe, Libya is not a particularly attractive country to work in for Maghrebi migrants. Libya immigration policies have been highly erratic (Hamood 2006:18), migrants do not have rights and salaries are considerably lower.

8 Source: observations by author in Libya (Tobruk, Benghazi, Tripoli, Zliten), April 2005.
large informal service sectors in Italy and Spain. An increasing proportion of independent Maghrebi labour migrants to Southern Europe are women who work as domestic workers, nannies, cleaners, or in agriculture and small industries (cf. Salih 2001).

On several occasions since the late 1980s, southern European governments were compelled to grant legal status to migrants, among which a large share of Moroccans and, to a lesser extent, Algerians, Tunisians and Egyptians. For instance, between 1980 and 2004, the combined Moroccan population officially residing in Spain and Italy increased from about 20,000 to 650,000 (de Haas 2007). Another development is increasing migration of higher educated from the Maghreb countries to Canada (Québec) and the US.

Until 1990 the history of Algerian emigration to Europe was the history of Algerian migration to France. In 1990 the Algerian community in France was estimated at more than one million people, representing 97 percent of all Algerians living outside of Algeria (Collyer 2003). From 1990 onwards migration began to diversify as a result of the outbreak of the Algerian civil war after 1991, killing more than 100,000 people. This led to an increase of refugee and economic migration to Europe – although a sharp distinction between the two categories is difficult to maintain (Collyer 2003).

Trans-Saharan Migration

Libya became a major pole of attraction for sub-Saharan immigrants since Qadhafi implemented his Pan-African policy in the early 1990s. A major anti-immigrant backlash in Libya since 2000 seems to have incited more sub-Saharan migrants to migrate to other Maghreb countries or to make the Mediterranean crossing (cf. Hamood 2006) In particular since 1995, a mixed group of asylum seekers and, increasingly, labour migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and even the Middle East and South Asia have gradually joined Maghrebs crossing the Strait of Gibraltar to Spain or from Tunisia to Italy (Lampedusa, Pantalleria or Sicily) (Barros et al. 2002; Boubakri 2004: 3). Tougher policing at the Strait of Gibraltar and Tunisian coast by Spanish-Moroccan and Tunisian-Italian forces have presumably led to a general diversification in attempted crossing points (Boubakri 2004: 5; de Haas 2005b; Fadloullah et al. 2000:113-5) from the eastern Moroccan coast to Algeria, from Tunisia’s coast to Libya, and from the Western Sahara and most recently Mauritania to the Canary Islands.

The common term ‘transit migrants’ may be misleading in three senses: First, the journey to north-Africa may take months and even years and is generally made in stages. (Barros et al. 2002; 2005:78). Second, a substantial proportion of students, professionals and refugees consider north-African countries as their primary destination (Barros et al. 2002; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005). Third, a substantial proportion of migrants failing or not venturing to enter Europe prefer to settle in Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia on a more long-term basis rather than return to their more unstable and substantially poorer home countries (cf. de Haas 2005b). Although lacking residency status and therefore vulnerable to exploitation, they sometimes to find jobs in specific niches in the informal service sector, tourism, petty trade, construction, agriculture, and, in Tunisia, football clubs (Boubakri 2004; Alioua 2005), work that Maghrebs sometimes shun (cf. Bredeloup and Pliez 2005:12). Others pursue studies in Tunisia and Morocco, sometimes as a means to gain residency status (Alioua 2005, Boubakri 2004).

Current Migration Characteristics

Persistent out-migration from north-Africa over the past four decades has led to the establishment of sizeable migrant communities abroad. Because reliable time series data of migration flows are unavailable, we can only rely on migrant stocks data to estimate the main migration trends from north African countries. Figure
1 displays estimates of stocks of North-African descendants living abroad based on sending-country data sources. These figures tend to include second and third generations, but may exclude undocumented migrants (see Fargues 2005). It reveals the concentration of Maghrebi migration on Western Europe and of Egyptian migration on the Arab oil producing countries.

On a total of 8 million, approximately 4.7 and 2.4 billion north-African descendants were believed to live in Europe and Arab countries, respectively, around 2004 (Fargues 2005). Morocco has the largest emigrant population of all countries involved with 3.1 million expatriates, followed by Egypt (2.7 billion), Algeria (1.4 billion) and Tunisia (840,000). It should be noted that receiving country data lead to substantially lower estimates: 40.4 percent for Morocco, 23.9 percent for Algeria, 47.6 percent for Tunisia and 59.1 percent for Egypt. In the case of the Maghreb countries, this seems to primarily reflect the fact that many receiving countries do not include naturalised persons as well as second and generation in these estimates. In all countries, but particularly in the case of Egypt, underregistration related to undocumented migration seems to play an additional role.

**FIGURE 1**

Stocks of North-African descendants according to destination region

![Figure 1](image.png)

Source: Various sending country sources cited in Fargues 2005 (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) and Labdelaoui 2005 (Algeria).

North-African migration to Europe has generally been the migration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from rural areas who obtained manual jobs in industry, agriculture and the formal and informal service sectors. In some cases, recruiters even preferred illiterate workers because they were not suspected of trade union activism (cf. de Haas 2003). Recent studies suggest that migration has become more selective for education, more urban and more female after 1980 (cf. Salih 2001; López García, 1999; Labdelaoui 2005). It is not entirely clear whether this reflects a veritable change in migration selectivity, or general processes of urbanisation and improvements in literacy and educational achievement, in the source countries, as some studies conducted in Morocco suggest (Fadloullah *et al.*, 2000:xvi,83; de Haas 2003). However, in Algeria the refugee dimension of much recent migration has reportedly contributed to the selective out-migration of the skilled and higher educated (Collyer 2003). However, particularly in the light of mass unemployment among north African university graduates, it is questionable whether a harmful ‘brain drain’ is occurring at all.

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9 Calculations based on data in Fargues 2005: 376.
Migration from Egypt to the Gulf has traditionally comprised a relatively high proportion of professionals, which is confirmed by empirical evidence that in Egypt international migrants were better educated than non-migrants on average (Schoorl et al. 2000:xvi). High-skilled migration from Egypt outside beyond Arab world has traditionally been focused on the US, Canada and Australia. Highly skilled emigration from students and professionals from the Maghreb was traditionally focused on France, but after 1990 there has been a significant increase of highly-skilled migration to the US and Canada. This has been related to very high unemployment among university graduates in the Maghreb (cf. Boubakri 2004:10; de Haas 2003; Bel Hadj Zekri 2005:311), but also to the lack of career opportunities and job satisfaction (Baldwin-Edwards 2005:4). On the basis of an extensive data analysis, Fargues et al. (2005) identified a striking pattern in which Europe attracts the lower educated while the US and Canada succeed in attracting the higher skilled North Africans.

A final trend is the increasing feminisation of labour migration from the Maghreb countries, which apparently concurs with more general trends of women’s emancipation related to their radically improved education (Fadloullah et al. 2000; Hammouda 2005; Labdelaoui 2005). The increasing feminisation migration from these countries seems related to the improved education of women, their partial emancipation and high female unemployment rates, as well as an increasing demand for domestic labourers, nannies, cleaners and other jobs in the (informal) service sector of Europe. Simultaneously, the share of dependent male migrants has been increasing due to increasingly common marriage migration (de Haas 2003).

Country-level data

Over the past four decades, Morocco has evolved into one of the world’s leading emigration countries. Moroccans form not only one of largest, but also one of the most dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. Out of a total population of 30 million, over 3 million people of Moroccan descent lived abroad in 2004. This does not include the approximately 700,000 Jews of Moroccan descent currently living in Israel (de Haas 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the remarkably increase of the Moroccan migrant stock living in the main European receiving countries since the late 1960s as well as the decreasing spatial focus on France. Between 1974 and 2004 Moroccan expatriate communities in Europe have increased at an average rate of 72,000 people per year in defiance of the increasingly restrictive immigration policies; although part of this increase represents natural growth. The remarkable post-1997 acceleration largely reflects the large-scale regularisation campaigns in Italy and Spain.

FIGURE 1
Evolution of Moroccan descendants living in main receiving countries 1955-2004

Source: Various sources in de Haas 2007
Figure 1 and table 2 also show a decreasing spatial focus on France. France is home to the largest legally residing population of Moroccan descent (more than 1,100,000), followed by Spain (424,000), the Netherlands (300,000), Italy (299,000), Belgium (293,000), and Germany (102,000). Smaller but rapidly growing communities of higher-skilled migrants live in the United States (100,000) and Canada (78,000).

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,113,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>300,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>293,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>423,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>298,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>50,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,616,871</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>79,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>25,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>57,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>472,219</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although France is still the main focus of Algerian migration with 1.1 billion expatriates reported in 2003 (Labdelaoui 2005:10), a clear diversification has occurred since the 1990s after the outbreak of the Algerian civil. Since 1995 the population of Algerian descent living in France has increased with 18 percent, but the population living in other European countries with 113 percent. The largest increases have been in Spain (547 percent) and Italy (126 percent). A 96 percent increase in Algerian presence in Germany reflects the influx of refugees to this country in the early 1990s. Algerian migration to southern Europe seems even more concentrated on Spain then Moroccan migration. However, the biggest increase has been in migration to Canada, increasing from 10,000 to 35,000 (see table 3).^9

### Table 3
Algerian citizens residing abroad (approximately 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,101,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>17,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>45,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>14,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,228,273</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab countries</td>
<td>76,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (1995)*</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia (1995)*</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,160</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


^9 Own calculations based Fargues 2005 and Labdelaoui 2005.
Compared to Algeria, Tunisian migration, though also more focused on France than Moroccan migration has also become more diversified. Besides an estimated 493,000 Tunisian descendants in France, approximately 54,000 Tunisian descendants are living in Germany (see table 4). In more recent years, neighbouring Italy has rapidly developed in the new principal destination for Tunisian labour migrants.

TABLE 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tunisian citizens residing abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>493,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>101,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>53,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium Other</td>
<td>16,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>697,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>60,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>7,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107,676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Consular data, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères; in Fargues 2005: 316.

Egyptian statistical services make a distinction between ‘temporary’ migration to Arab countries and ‘permanent migration’ to Western countries, although this is mainly a formal distinction. Table 5 shows the predominance of migration to Saudi Arabia (924,000 migrants), Libya (333,000), Jordan (227,000) and Kuwait (191,000). Remarkably, the US (318,000), Canada (110,000) and Australia (70,000) host the largest Egyptian communities outside the Arab world. More recently, mostly undocumented migration from Egyptians to Italy and Greece has gained momentum (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2005:7). The reported migration stocks in the Arab and south-European countries are likely to be underestimates due to substantial undocumented migration.

TABLE 5
Egyptians citizens residing abroad by Country of Residence – 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Temporary’ Migration</th>
<th>‘Permanent’ Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>65,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>226,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>190,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>332,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>923,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,912,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>318,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>824,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on migrant stock data, figure 2 attempts to estimate the net intra-regional migration movement. Nevertheless, these figures are likely to severely underestimate the true level of intra-regional mobility. In particular, short-term migrants are unlikely to register with their consulates in destination migrants. The figures illustrate Libya’s role of host country of migrants from within the region, particularly from Egypt.

**FIGURE 2**

Estimated net intra-regional migration based on migrant stock data (2002-2004)

![Graph showing estimated net intra-regional migration](chart.png)

Source: Own calculations based on various sources cited in Fargues 2005

**Immigration**

Due to the undocumented character of this migration, there are no reliable estimates about the numbers of sub-Saharan migrants living in North-African countries, although it seems certain that their communities are increasing. Alioua (2005) estimates the number of sub-Saharan migrants and refugees living in Morocco at several tens of thousands. According to Libyan authorities, each year between 75,000 and 100,000 foreign nationals enter the country. Libyan local authorities estimate the number of legal foreign workers at 600,000, while illegal immigrants are estimated to number between 750,000 and 1.2 million (Bredeloup and Pliez 2005:6; EC 2004). Another source claims that Libya houses 2 to 2.5 million immigrants (including 200,000 Moroccans, 60,000 Tunisians and 20,000 to 30,000 Algerians and 1 to 1.5 million sub-Saharan Africans), representing 25 to 30 percent of its total population (Boubakri 2004:2). Cairo hosts one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world, mainly Sudanese but also Palestinians, Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans. In addition, since the 1970s many Sudanese workers have migrated to Egypt. The current refugee and migrant population in Egypt (mainly Cairo) is estimated at levels of anywhere between 0.5 and 3 million (Zohry and Harrell-Bond 2003:49).

**THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS OF MIGRATION:**

**THE CASE OF MOROCCO**

For all four north-African migrant sending countries, migration has played a major role in relieving tensions...
on the labour market. Morocco, Tunisia and (since 1971) Egypt have pursued a persistent policy of openly or tacitly stimulating migration as a development tool. In particular return migrants were imagined to be important actors of change. While the attitude of the Algerian state towards migration has been more ambivalent, it has gradually adopted a *laissez faire* approach to emigration largely out of economic necessity. Although the labour-exporting policies of the 1960s and 1970s have been abandoned and lip service might be paid to migration restrictionist aims of European countries, North African states have little genuine interest in reduced migration while (south-) European employers remain in need of their labour.

When sending and receiving countries gradually realised that many migrants would not return, the policies of sending states increasingly focused on fiscal and economic policies aiming at securing remittances, stimulating investments of migrants’ living abroad as well as symbolic policies aimed at fostering bonds between expatriate populations and their imagined or real homelands (for an overview, see Fargues 2004), all these countries except for Algeria have now embarked upon a policy aiming at ‘courting the diaspora’. To illustrate the development impacts of migration in their relation to policies to enhance such impacts, this section will concentrate on the case of Morocco, the region’s most prominent emigration country.

**Migration and Remittances as A National Development Strategy**

Throughout the post-independence period, the Moroccan state has actively stimulated international out-migration for political and economic reasons. International migration was seen as a “safety valve” to prevent political tensions in Berber areas, which had a rebellious reputation vis-à-vis the central state. It is not coincidental that most emigration occurred from the eastern part of the Rif mountain area, the southwestern Sous region and the (usually river) oases located southeast of the High Atlas (de Haas 2005b). These predominantly Berber speaking areas were known for their rebellious reputation vis-à-vis the central, Arab state. The Moroccan state quickly recognised the possibilities that a migration policy could have in terms of relieving tensions by promoting emigration from these regions, in particular from the notoriously turbulent Rif (Reniers 1999:684). These policies were mainly pursued through directing recruiters to these areas and through selective passport issuance policies.

Besides being a political instrument, migration was also seen as a tool for national economic development. In the 1965-68 Three-Year Plan, the utility of migration was primarily seen through the skills and knowledge that migrants were expected to acquire through work and education abroad. It was expected that this experience would be beneficial for national industrial development. The Five-Year Plan of 1968-72 largely played down the education argument and emphasized the quantitative aspects of migration in relieving pressures on the labour market and the positive monetary effects of remittances. This shift in attention can be explained by the increase in unemployment and increasing deficits in the balance of payments which Morocco witnessed in that period (Heinemeijer et al. 1977).

The belief that migrants would be particular actors of change, importing new ideas, attitudes and skills, gradually faded. Efforts to stimulate the participation of returned migrants in the development process through investment-stimulating programs, sometimes in collaboration with receiving countries, generally failed, partly through bad implementation, partly because of a lack of commitment among migrants and the general distrust in government agencies (Fadloullah et al. 2000:32; Fellat 1996; Obdeijn 1993). Moreover, migrants seemed not to be willing to invest in productive enterprises and spent most of their money ‘irrationally’ on consumption and “non-productive” housing construction (de Haas 2003). This contributed to the rising scepticism about the usefulness of migrants in the development of their regions of origin.

In contrast to policies aiming to stimulate investments by migrants, policies to increase remittance transfers have been more successful. Since the late 1960s, Morocco has encouraged the creation of a network
of consulates, post offices and bank branches abroad (in particular the Banque Populaire) to facilitate the transfer of remittances. Notwithstanding some relapses, remittances surged from 200 million dirham (23 million US$) in 1968 to over 18.5 billion dirham (2.1 billion US$) in 1992.

At the same time, the Moroccan state attempted to maintain a tight control on migrant communities in Europe by explicitly addressing migrants as its subjects and, until the early 1990s, actively discouraging their integration into the receiving countries (Obdeijn 1993). Through a network of a control and spying networks consisting of Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and government-controlled migrants associations such as the infamous “Amicales”, Moroccan migrants were discouraged from establishing independent organizations, joining trade unions or political parties in the countries that the Moroccan state considered only as their temporary place of residence. This policy served a double goal. Firstly, the state wanted to prevent Moroccan migrants from becoming a potential factor of political opposition “from outside”. Secondly, integration was perceived as endangering the vital remittance transfers (de Haas 2003).

From controlling emigrants to courting the diaspora

However, an ominous stagnation in remittances in the 1990s and a growing consciousness that repressive policies alienated migrants rather than binding them closer to the Moroccan state prompted the Moroccan authorities to replace repression by a more positive attitude (de Haas and Plug 2006). Moreover, the integration-discouraging policies were increasingly criticized by northwest European governments. Both the Moroccan and receiving governments eventually started to accept the fact that most migrants would stay and to incorporate this in their policies. While European receiving states that embarked upon more active integration policies, the Moroccan state gradually shifted from a control-focused emigrant to a diaspora policy.

The fear for a future decline in the vital remittance transfers prompted the Moroccan authorities to revise their attitude towards migrants. This concurred with a process of general political change leading to an improvement of Morocco’s human rights record. This process was consolidated and accelerated since the death of Hassan II and the accession to the throne of Mohammed VI in 1999. Although the king has not given up any of its essential powers, and although it is debatable to what extent any real democratisation has occurred, civil liberties have expanded over the past 15 years. Furthermore, a general neoclassical turn in domestic economic policies implied an increasing deregulation and opening up of the Moroccan economy.

This went along with high hopes being put on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as a tool for national economic development. After years of scepticism, this also created renewed hope in the positive role migrants may play in encouraging investment and economic growth. Consequently, migrants were no longer approached as inert “remittance milch cows”, but increasingly as potential businesspersons who should be convinced to invest in Morocco (de Haas 2003).

These general economic and political trends created the necessary room for a significant change in attitude towards Morocco’s migrant communities. Along with the dismantling of the control apparatus in Europe, this has meant a more positive attitude towards naturalization, dual citizenship and voting rights for migrants abroad. In this context, the new official term ‘Moroccans Resident Abroad’ (MRE) to designate migrants marked a significant change in orientation from the previous ‘Moroccan Workers Abroad’ (TME) (Lacroix 2005). This marked a striking reversal of policy analysis, in which social and economic integration of migrants abroad is no longer seen as a danger, but as a beneficial process which enables migrants to send more money home and to invest.

A ministry for Moroccans residing abroad was created in 1990, to be incorporated in 1997 into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Fargues 2004b). Also in 1990, the Moroccan government established the Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l’Étranger. Its aim is to foster and reinforce the links between
Moroccan migrants and Morocco through assisting them in various ways, both while in Europe and during their summer holidays in Morocco, and to inform and guide migrants on investment opportunities.

In particular after 1998, the Moroccan state also started to seriously clamp down on the long delays, corruption and harassment migrants-on-vacation used to experience at the borders in the sea ports of Tangiers and Ceuta and, to a lesser extent, at the various airports. Customs procedures work more smoothly and are less corrupt than in the past, and the Moroccan and even Spanish, French and Italian motorways even have service centres specially fitted out for Moroccan migrants-on-vacation on their way to and from their fatherland.

Migrants who criticize the government are rarely bothered anymore when visiting Morocco. Increasing civic liberties also implied more freedom for migrants to establish (transnational) organizations such as Berber, cultural and “home town” and aid associations (cf. Lacroix 2005). In November 2005, King Mohammed VI announced that migrants will obtain the right to vote and be elected in the Chambre des Représentants as well as the creation of a Conseil Supérieur de la Communauté marocaine à l’étranger. Yet despite the recent shift in policies, the Moroccan state has not given up a number of policy instruments to exert a certain level of control. This is most evident in Morocco’s systematic opposition against Moroccan descendants in Europe relinquishing Moroccan citizenship.

On the economic side, new monetary policies have been applied in Morocco since the end of the 1980s, involving the lifting of restrictions on exchange and on the repatriation of money (Giubilaro 1997:30). In 1989 the Banque Al Amal was created with the aim of helping to finance emigrants’ projects (Leichtman 2002). Since 1995, migrants have been allowed to open foreign exchange banking accounts with Moroccan banks (Fellat 1996:316), which have established an increasing number of foreign offices in European cities with sizeable Moroccan communities. Remittances are further encouraged through fiscal policies favouring migrants (Refass 1999:98). Moreover, currency devaluations have increased the value of remittances and encouraged migrants to remit money (Giubilaro 1997:30). There came also increasing awareness of the need to reduce obstacles to investment, such as the complexity of regulations, corruption and excessive red tape (Kaioua 1999:124-5). In 2002, King Mohammed VI announced plans to ease administrative procedures for obtaining business permits and to guide investors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TABLE 6</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main changes in the attitude of the Moroccan state towards its expatriate population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Until 1989</th>
<th>After 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Moroccan Workers Abroad’ (TME)</td>
<td>‘Moroccans Residents Abroad’ (MRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State repression</td>
<td>‘Courting the diaspora’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid naturalisation</td>
<td>Encourage double citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration endangers link with Morocco</td>
<td>Integration favours remittances and investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants as a political threat</td>
<td>Migrants as a political tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A decisive success?

At first glance, the new Moroccan diaspora policies seem to have reversed the stagnation in remittances. In 2001, a spectacular increase in remittances occurred to $3.3 billion from $2.2 in 2000. This increase was partly attributed to the so-called “Euro effect” concomitant money laundering, and, perhaps, the effect of 9/11.¹¹ However, after a minor relapse in 2002, remittances have shown a continuing steep upward trend in

¹¹ It has been argued that the introduction of the Euro has incited Moroccans living in Morocco to convert their ready pre-Euro cash into Mo-
subsequent years, to reach an unprecedented figure of $4.2 billion in 2004 (see figure 3).

The spectacular rise in remittances seems to confirm the success of Morocco’s new migration and development policies. Yet a recent analysis of the destination-country specific evolution of remittance flows to Morocco (de Haas and Plug 2006) indicated that the structural solidity of remittances should primarily be explained by the unforeseen persistence of migration to north-western Europe; the unexpected durability of transnational and transgenerational links between migrants and ‘stay behinds’; and, last but not least, new labour migration towards southern Europe.

**FIGURE 3**

Total volume of official remittance, oda, and fdi flows to Morocco (1960-2003).


Through successive legalisation campaigns, new, rapidly growing migrant communities have been established in Spain, Italy, which are likely to significantly increase in the coming decade through continuing labour migration, family reunification and family formation. Whereas remittances from most classic destination countries stabilized over the 1990s, remittances from the new destination countries showed a steep increase.

Thus, the most effective instrument for securing remittances has been securing continued migration. Although continuing migration largely explains the structural solidity of remittance, the recent policies to attract remittances, the expansion of financial services, low inflation and the absence of a large black market for foreign exchange have probably contributed to this and also explain why Morocco has been relatively successful in directing remittances through official channels.\(^{12}\)

The changes in policies and the measures taken to allow the collective annual summer vacation trip, which is known in Morocco as the *opération transit*, to run as smoothly as possible as well as serious measures to clamp down on inland harassment of tourists and migrants by so-called *faux guides* (‘bogus guides’), corrupt policeman, *gendarmes* have made Morocco a more pleasant country to visit in general. In addition to

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\(^{12}\) Remittances in kind in the form of goods (e.g., electronics, household appliances, furniture, cars, car spare parts, clothes) taken to Morocco as gifts or as merchandise by migrants have been estimated to represent one quarter to one third of official remittances (Refass 1999:100-102).
the recent large-scale legalisations of Moroccan workers in Spain and Italy, which have greatly facilitated the capacity of migrants to circulate and remit, this general change is likely to have contributed to the enormous increase in the number of migrants visiting during the summer holidays, alongside with a steady increase in tourists visiting Morocco.

Whereas 848,000 migrants and 159,000 cars entered the northern harbours of Ceuta, Tangiers, and Melilla in 1993 between 15 June and 15 September 1993 (López García 1994), Moroccan government sources claim that over 2.2 million migrants and 580,000 cars have crossed the Strait of Gibraltar over the same period in 2003. The 259 percent increase in the annual number of migrants entering Morocco in one decade have certainly contributed to increasing remittance receipts, in particular because Moroccan remittance data include money brought to Morocco which is converted into local currency at local banks.

For the Moroccan state, remittances are a crucial and relatively stable source of foreign exchange and have become a vital element in sustaining Morocco’s balance of payments. Remittances have proved to be a substantially higher and less volatile source of foreign exchange than official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (de Haas and Plug 2006; Giubilaro 1997:31) (see figure 3). In 2003, Morocco was the developing world’s fourth largest remittance receiver. Over the same period, remittances were also consistently higher than receipts from agricultural exports, the other pillar of the Moroccan (export) economy. In 2002, remittances represented 22.9 percent of total exports and 21.6 percent of total imports of goods and services, and remittances were only 5.0 percent lower than receipts from the expanding Moroccan tourism industry (de Haas and Plug 2006).

A ‘stone age mentality’?

From perceived to real impacts

Although few would deny the direct positive contribution of international remittances to the living standards of families left behind, the extent to which migration and remittances can bring about sustained development and economic growth in migrant-sending regions and countries is quite a different question. Widespread scepticism still prevails in Moroccan policy circles on the development impact of migration. However, on the basis of recent empirical evidence, and notwithstanding empirical lacunas and methodological flaws, there seems reason to question the received knowledge that remittances are mostly spent on ‘non-productive’ purposes and that such expenses would automatically be non-developmental. Although, it is also clear that migration and remittances as well as symbolic policies to court the Moroccan diaspora alone cannot solve more general constraints to development.

For households, international migration can be an effective way of enormously improving their financial situation and living conditions (Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. xx). There is macro-economic evidence that remittances contribute substantially to income growth (Testas 2002). It has been projected that 1.17 million out of 30 million Moroccans would fall back to absolute poverty without international remittances, and the proportion living below the poverty line would increase from 19.0 to 23.2 percent. Nevertheless, the middle and higher income classes profit relatively more from remittances than the lowest income groups because migration itself has proved to be a selective process (Teto 2001). In regions with high international out-migration, the contribution of remittances to income growth can be far higher. In several communities in Morocco’s three main migration belts, one fifth to over a half of all households have at least one member who has migrated

abroad, and the average income of such households might be up to 2.5 higher than that of non-migrant households (de Haas 2003; Schoorl et al. 2000).

Four decades of intensive international migration have fundamentally transformed sending communities, as well as Moroccan society in general. Migration and remittances have enabled the partial emancipation of formerly subaltern socio-ethnic groups, who have subsequently been able to escape from the constraints of traditional peasant society (cf. Ilahiane 2001). Subsequently, traditional forms of inequality based on hereditary factors such as complexion, ethnicity and land ownership have often been replaced by new forms of intra-community inequality based on access to international remittances.

In comparison to the 1960s and 1970s, and partly due to restrictive and selective immigration policies, access to international migration seems to become increasingly selective on education and access to financial resources or on access largely kinship-based international migrant networks. Although nonmigrants do indirectly profit from remittance expenditure through local multiplier and employment effects, the overall impact of migration is creating and sustaining new forms of intra-community inequality based on access to international migration resources (de Haas 2003).

Exposure to migrants’ relative success and wealth has also affected the perceptions and increased aspirations of Moroccans, allegedly creating a culture of migration (cf. Schoorl et al. 2000). Several studies indicated that migration has hardly the often assumed positive effect on changing norms on gender roles, which rather reflect general processes of cultural change (Hajjarabi 1995; Van Rooij 2000). In general, the socio-cultural (religious, social stratification, gender) impacts of migration are notoriously difficult to disentangle from general processes of change. Migration itself is constitutive part of a complex set of social, cultural and economic transformations that have increasingly integrate Morocco and in wider social, economic and migratory systems, as well as a factor perpetuating and intensifying and accelerating these processes at the local and regional levels.

Recent studies have challenged the conventional view that migrants indulge in daily conspicuous consumption by showing that they are more prone to invest than was previously assumed (De Haas, 2003; Khachani, 1998; Refass, 1999). There has been a general diversification in the economic activities of migrants (Khachani 1998). In several migrant-sending communities, remittances not only enable migrants’ households to construct modern houses, but also permit the purchase of agricultural land and modern agricultural equipment, the introduction of state-of-the-art stock-raising, or the establishment of non-agricultural enterprises, such as those in the tourist sector, and the setting up of commercial establishments and small and medium-size industries in food-processing and the supply of building materials (cf. Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004; cf. Benchérif and Popp, 1990; 2000).

There has also been a revaluation of the well-known and much-despised preference among migrants to construct houses (cf. Fellat, 1996; de Haas 2003; Hamdouch 2000). In this context, scholars and policy makers have tended to strongly disapprove of what has been dismissed as an irrational ‘mentalité de pierre’ (stone [age] mentality) (Kaioua 1999: 124). Nevertheless, the importance attached to housing should primarily be explained by a legitimate quest for space, safety, privacy, fewer conflicts, hygiene, and better health. Moreover, the construction of a house for the nuclear family allows women to escape from the authority of their parents-in-law (cf. Hajjarabi 1988; Van Rooij 2000). Taking into account the large demand for housing, real estate investments can also be a relatively secure and rewarding investment strategy, which may enable migrant households to secure and increase income (cf. Ben Ali, 1996, p. 360). Moreover, house ownership provides ‘life insurance’ for the migrants’ households (De Haas, 2003).

The ‘lost labour’ of able-bodied (migrated) men from rural areas is commonly ascribed a key role in the process of agricultural decline. However, this pessimistic perspective is challenged by empirical studies showing that remittances can facilitate agricultural investments through the purchase of land, modern agricultural equipment, such as tractors and water pumps, the introduction of new crops and techniques and the establishment of new farms. Migrants show a particular preference for investments in the development of new
irrigated agriculture (Bencherifa and Popp 2000; Pascon 1985; Popp, 1999). Although the initial effect of migration on agricultural productivity can indeed be been negative, in the longer term, and after an adjustment process, this agricultural decline has often been reversed through remittance-enabled agricultural investments (De Haas, 2001).

In migrant-sending areas throughout Morocco, the remittance-propelled building fever has transformed several villages in migrant sending areas into towns, where migrants also prefer to locate other investments. General processes of urbanization and livelihood diversification seem to be associated with and reinforced by shifting investment priorities among migrants. Investments in all kinds of service enterprises, ranging from grocery stores, commerce, coffee houses, phone houses, internet cafes, hotels, travel agencies, restaurants, money changers, to transportation (taxis, vans, buses) have become relatively more important to the detriment of real estate and, particularly, agricultural investments (cf. Berriane, 1996; 1997; de Haas 2003; Fadloullah et al., 2000; Hamdouch 2000). There is also some evidence that international migration has positive effects on the education of migrants’ children (Bencherifa, 1996: 418-9; De Haas, 2003: 325-335).

Through urban-based real estate, business investments and consumption expenditure, international migrant households simultaneously capitalize on, and actively contribute to, the accelerated urban growth and concentration of economic activities in existing urban centres and migrant boomtowns. This also allows for a more positive evaluation of migrants’ consumption. Several studies suggest that consumption and so-called non-productive investments in housing and the service sector have beneficial income multiplier effects through creating employment and increasing income among non-migrants as well.

The simultaneous occurrence of out-migration and investments has caused an increase in urban and rural wages. Although this has typically been evaluated as a negative migration impact, this wage increase is obviously beneficial for non-migrants. So, migration and remittances have considerably improved living conditions, income, education and spurred economic activity through agricultural, real estate and business investment. This has transformed international migrant-sending areas in the Rif, Sous and southern oases into relatively prosperous areas that now even attract internal ‘reverse’ migrants from poorer areas (Bencherifa 1996; Berriane 1996; Bonnet and Bossard 1973; de Haas 2003).

Although migration has rather created new forms of access to remittances-based inequality than decreasing intra-community inequality as such, nonmigrant households have often benefited indirectly from the employment and multiplier effects of migrant households’ consumption and investments. This has led to general, regional improvement of livelihoods and the reduction of absolute poverty. This exemplifies the ambiguities involved in attaching relative weights to distributional versus absolute income objectives.

It is also difficult to give an unambiguous assessment on whether international migration has exacerbated or decreased spatial inequalities. This fundamentally depends on the scale of analysis. Migrants’ investments are often allocated in towns in migrant sending regions and not the village of origin. When focusing on the village level, one might then conclude that many investments tend to leak away to regional towns. However, when focusing at the regional level the conclusion would be that most investments remain within the region, and that spatial inequalities with the industrial centre of Morocco have decreased (de Haas forthcoming).

Unexploited potentials

Although empirical evidence challenges prevailing pessimism, there is also widespread agreement that developmental potential of migration is not fully realized due to several structural constraints. This include the generally unfavourable investment climate, characterized by an inadequate infrastructure and the absence of public services, particularly in rural areas; failing credit and insurance markets; excessive red tape and corruption confronting potential investors; difficulties in obtaining title deeds on property; inefficient judiciary and a lack of legal security; as well as a general lack of trust in government institutions and doubts about future
political and economic stability (Bencherifa and Popp, 2000; Kaioua, 1999). This seems to explain the particularly low level of Moroccan return migration, migrants’ prudent investment behaviour and the tendency to invest in relatively low-risk sectors, such as housing and retail trade.

Empirical work also stresses that migration impacts are heterogeneous across space, socio-ethnic and gender groups, and tend to change over time and household migration cycles (Berriane, 1996; de Haas 2003; Heinemeijer et al. 1977; Refass 1999). International migrants tend to allocate agricultural investments in regions where arable land and irrigation water is relatively abundant. The availability of public services and infrastructure (e.g., paved roads, electricity, drinking water, schools) appear to be highly important factors determining the attraction of rural regions for migrants’ investments in general (Bencherifa 1991; de Haas 2001; Popp, 1999, p. 194). Isolation and the absence of basic public amenities are likely to prompt the economic and social disengagement of migrants and household relocation to nearby urban centres (Bencherifa and Popp, 2000, p. 143).

As Heinemeijer et al. (1977) already argued, although migrants exhibit a relatively high willingness and propensity to invest, the investment opportunities for migrants in their regions of origin are often limited. In this respect, it is important to remember that, depending on the specific development context, migration and remittances may also give people the capability and freedom to retreat from, as much as to invest in, local economic activities.

CONCLUSION

The immanent danger of conceiving ‘the’ North African migration system’ would be to assume a false degree of regional unity and communality of national migration experiences. The specific international migration experiences of North-African countries and regions within countries reveal striking differences. It therefore seems to be more useful to conceive north-Africa as a region in which countries are connected to several and partly overlapping trans-continental and intra-regional migration system to varying degrees. At the most general level, we can make a distinction between the core Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), which have been firmly integrated into the Euro (EU)-Mediterranean system, and Egypt, which is predominantly connected to the Gulf (GCC) migration system and other Arab countries such as Libya, Jordan and Lebanon. Nevertheless, over the past decade there has been an increase of Egyptian migration towards Europe.

A one-sided focus on the massive net emigration occurring from North Africa would also conceal the existence of an intra-regional migration sub-system centred on Libya. This country has not only evolved into the main intra-regional migration pole, but Libyan pan-African policies of the 1990s have also played a role in mounting trans-Saharan migration to north-Africa and what might become the integration of North African and sub-Saharan migration systems.

The transformations that have taken place in these north-African migration systems cannot be understood without taking into account broader changes in the political and economic context. The analysis has indicated that general migration trends are largely determined by major shocks such as (colonial, civil and inter-state) wars and general political-economic change. The process of colonisation initially went along with immigration and settlement, in particular in Algeria, but concomitant processes of state formation, capitalist penetration, infrastructure development and increased population in combination with the demand for migrant labour in European and, at a later stage, the Gulf countries, would soon create a counter-movement of emigration.

General changes also created the room for specific migration policies by sending and receiving states. Through recruitment and selective passport issuance, these policies have played a crucial role in shaping initial migration patterns, after which such initial patterns tended to develop their own momentum through the self-perpetuating dynamics of migrant networks (cf. Castles 2004, Massey 1989). The persistent increase and even acceleration of North-African migration to Europe over the 1990s exemplifies the extremely limited
ability of specific migration policies to counteract the structural demand for migrant labour and the migration-facilitating working of networks.

The north-African case also exemplifies the ‘permanency of temporary migration’ (cf. Martin 1999). Although both the European and the Gulf states have insisted that most intended to be temporary, even the authoritarian Gulf states have not been able to prevent long-term settlement and substantial undocumented immigration. Paradoxically, restrictive immigration policies have pushed people into permanent settlement. The Moroccan case study has shown that it can take many decades before positive development impacts of migration gain full momentum, that ‘integrated’ and settled migrants possess greater capabilities to remit and invest, and that migrants possessing residency rights or (double) citizenship have a higher propensity to return and circulate. These experiences undermine the assumptions that the newly proposed temporary migration programmes can be effective and that they will favour development in sending countries. Acknowledging the need for certain categories of migrants and the associated granting of rights to long-term migrants seems a more fruitful approach to stimulate circulation and enhance development impacts.

The Moroccan case has also shown that policies to increase remittances and channel them through formal channels can be successful if they coincide with general macro-economic stability and a banking infrastructure. Although migration and remittances generally have enabled households and communities to increase their income and substantially improve their living conditions, migration is however too limited a phenomenon to be expected to remove more structural development constraints. The fact that in 2004 even Moroccan remittances constituted ‘only’ 8.4 percent of total GDP (2004) should put hopes that migration alone can generate sustainable development in a more realistic perspective.

Although they can play a certain positive role, so-called ‘diaspora policies’ have limited effects if they are not accompanied by general reform and progress. It would also be naïve to assume that the recent charm offensive of several north-African states has all of the sudden removed people’s deeply rooted general distrust in these states. Only if general investment conditions improve and trust in the state is restored, is it likely migrants will massively invest in north-African countries. Although specific schemes targeted at migrants can help to a certain extent, the only way of genuinely releasing the development potential of migration and migrants resources is to creating attractive investment environments, generating economic growth and building trust in political and legal institutions of sending countries, along with sensible immigration policies that do not deter migrants from circulating.

In particular in southern Europe a combination of unprecedented low fertility rates and the presence of large informal sectors is likely to sustain the demand for unskilled (and skilled) immigrant labour. Extensive migrant networks and the long, southern European coastline make this migration notoriously difficult to control. However, this does not imply that current migration patterns will necessarily persist. Over the past two decades, the boundaries between the north-African migration systems have become increasingly blurred, and the striking diversification and diffusion of migration itineraries point at the growing complexity of migration systems. This points to the necessity of conceptualising change in established migration systems.

Combining the spatial notion of migration systems with the temporal notion of migration transitions, we can conceive that the transformation of south-European countries into immigration countries has provoked the southward shift of the Euro-Mediterranean ‘labour frontier’, a development which has offered renewed and reinforced labour migration opportunities for North African countries, which in their turn seem on top of their migration hump. The challenging question here is whether the increasing migration towards and through north-African countries is indeed heralding their further integration in the expanding European migration system and their future transition into immigration countries for sub-Saharan and other countries, as transitional migration theory would suggest (de Haas 2007).

14 Officially registered remittances represented 2.9 percent of Algerian GDP; 5.1 percent of Tunisian GDP; 3.4 percent of Libyan GDP and 4.2 percent of Egyptian GDP (2004 data. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Some current trends might herald such a migration transition. This particularly related to the increasingly complex segmentation of north-African labour markets. We also need to look at the specific structure and evolution of the increasingly complex segmentation of North African labour markets to understand the paradox of sustained out-migration from most north-African states and what appears to be the settlement of sub-Saharan migrants in the same countries. Such ‘migration hierarchies’ cannot be explained by push-pull models. Even in poorer Maghreb countries we witness a striking structural unemployment among native higher educated who increasingly shun unskilled jobs. The economic growth in and migration to some northern parts of Tunisia and Morocco might indeed indicate a further southward shift of the Euro-Mediterranean labour frontier across the Mediterranean further into north Africa.

These trends might be reinforced by demographic transitions. Most north African countries have almost reached the point where the dramatic reductions in fertility since the 1970s will result in the reduction of the number of people attaining working age beginning in 2010 to reach full momentum in the period 2015-2020. The next generations entering the labour market will theoretically face less labour market competition and also bear an exceptionally light demographic burden compared to past and future generations (Fargues 2004). This might eventually lead to declining international out-migration and increasing labour immigration from sub-Saharan countries.

Whether, and the extent to which such a transition will really happen, crucially depends on internal political and economic reform leading to democratisation, stability and more attractive investment environments. However, it is also contingent on various exogenous factors, in particular, on how association agreements with the EU will be implemented, how this will affect competitiveness and to what extent market integration will also allow increased access of north African producers to the EU market.

Even successful economic integration might in the short term encourage migration. Adjustment to new market and policy environments is never instantaneous, while the negative impacts of trade liberalisation (on protected sectors) often are immediate. The expansion of production in sectors potentially favoured by trade reforms always takes time, which seems a recipe for a migration hump in the wake of trade reforms (Martin and Taylor 1996:52). Furthermore, economic development and increased trade and transportation will probably enable more people to migrate abroad on the short term.

However, genuine market integration combined with domestic political and economic reform might in the longer term indeed lead to sustained economic growth and the transformation of north-African countries into labour importers. If that were the case, economic development and democratisation is also likely to incite migrants to massively invest and return, and thereby further reinforce these positive trends. In the recent past this has happened in countries such as Spain, Italy, South Korea and Taiwan. Without such broader development, migration is likely to continue also in the longer term. The paradox is that development in migrant-sending societies is a prerequisite for return and investment by migrants rather than a consequence of migration.

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